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Abstract
Rationale, Aims and Objectives: Six years ago, the Supreme Court judgement in
Montgomery v Lanarkshire changed medical law. It introduced a new patient-based
standard of care for the communication of treatment risks and alternatives, rejecting
the doctor-based standard that had long governed all aspects of medical negligence.
This is the first systematic review to analyse the literature on Montgomery. Our aim is
to appraise and synthesize the literature on Montgomery's impact on medicine and
the law and to identify areas for further academic enquiry and implications for pro-
fessional guidance and training.
Methods: Searches were run in Medline, Embase, PsycINFO, Web of Science,
Scopus, Westlaw UK, HeinOnline, and LexisNexis. Two reviewers screened papers.
Extracted data was analysed and discussed by an interdisciplinary team. PRISMA
guidelines were followed.
Results: Of the 1134 papers identified, 100 met the inclusion criteria. These
papers revealed significant disagreement on four core sets of issues, focusing
on Montgomery's impact on: (1) legal and professional duties; (2) medical prac-
tice; (3) the patient experience; and (4) litigation. The first set addresses
whether the case actually changed doctors' legal and professional duties, the
relationship between GMC guidance and medical law, and the boundaries of
Montgomery. The second explores whether the decision has incentivized defen-
sive medicine, its resource implications, and doctors' knowledge of it. The third
concerns whether and how the decision has promoted patient autonomy and
involvement in their own care. The fourth focuses on whether the case has
caused an increase in litigation.
Conclusions: Despite the abundance of legal and medical literature on Montgomery,
many issues remain unresolved. Empirical research is required for many of the ques-
tions. Doctrinal analysis informed by medical knowledge is also required to assess
whether Montgomery may have unrecognized ramifications—for example, whether it
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will require the disclosure of risks associated with diagnostic uncertainty, where doc-
tors advise patients without performing procedures.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Six years ago, the Supreme Court's judgement in Montgomery
v Lanarkshire1 introduced a new patient-based standard of care for
the disclosure of treatment risks and alternatives, rejecting the
doctor-based Bolam standard that had long governed important
aspects of medical negligence. The Bolam standard requires doctors to
act ‘in accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible
body of medical men skilled in that particular art’.2 Following
Montgomery, doctors are now under a duty to ‘take reasonable care
to ensure that the patient is aware of any material risks involved in
any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative or
variant treatments’.1 A risk is deemed to be material if: (1) ‘a reason-
able person in the patient's position would be likely to attach signifi-
cance to the risk’; or (2) ‘the doctor is or should reasonably be aware
that the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it’.1
There is a substantial body of literature on the legal significance
of the case and its practical significance for patients and doctors. This
literature can be found in both legal and medical journals, but the two
bodies of work rarely connect. This review systematically identifies,
appraises, and synthesizes the literature on Montgomery. Bridging the
current gap between legal and medical journals, it provides an analysis
of how the two disciplines perceive Montgomery's impact on the law,
doctors, patients, and litigation. In addition, it identifies some issues
that warrant further investigation.
2 | METHODS
A systematic review framework was employed to ensure a robust and
replicable searching strategy. Critical interpretive synthesis was used
to analyse the large body of literature from the medical and legal disci-
plines PRISMA guidelines were followed (see Data S1).
2.1 | Identification of studies
I.L.G. and I.K. developed the search strategy using an iterative process
to answer the research questions. I.K. developed detailed searches for
the medical databases; an adapted search was run in the legal data-
bases to accommodate their structure.
For medical articles, searches were run in Medline via OVID,
Embase via OVID, PsycINFO via Ebsco, Web of Science Core Collec-
tion, and Scopus. For legal articles, searches were run in Westlaw UK,
Hein Online, and Lexis Nexis. The medical searches were run by
I.K. on 26 March 2020 and re-run on 4 March 2021. The legal
searches were run by I.L.G. on 7 April 2020 and re-run on 4 March
2021. See Data S2 for the search terms.
2.2 | Screening
Articles were screened to determine if they were original research
articles, in English, and the title or abstract contained a discussion of
Montgomery v Lanarkshire at any stage in its litigation.
2.3 | Study selection
For the medical literature, the titles and abstracts of the papers were
screened by two members of the team (I.L.G. and A.S.) in Rayyan on
30 March 2020.
For the legal literature, which was difficult to export in a format
suitable for Rayyan, the titles and abstracts were manually entered
into an Excel spreadsheet and screened by two members of the team
(I.L.G. and A.S.) on 14 April 2020.
2.4 | Inclusion criteria
Papers were included if they focussed on the Montgomery judgement
and were peer reviewed.
2.5 | Exclusion criteria for data extraction
The following articles were excluded
1. Those that focused on Montgomery's application outside of medical
practice (e.g., in banking, construction, midwifery, and pharmacy);
2. Those that only mentioned Montgomery briefly in the body of the
text or in the footnotes;
3. Those focused on specific legal issues outside the law of negli-
gence (e.g., the disclosure of confidential patient data; organ
donation; and the non-delegable duties of hospitals);
4. Those with an anonymous author;
5. Abstracts, posters, replies to articles, book reviews, letters, and
textbook chapters.
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2.6 | Data extraction
ILG extracted data from the included papers.
3 | FINDINGS
Data was extracted from 100 papers (see Figure 1 for PRISMA
flowchart).
Table 1 summarizes the themes that emerged from the literature.
The literature on Montgomery raises diverse issues. These can be
usefully organized in four themes, namely the impact of Montgomery
on: (a) legal and professional duties; (b) medical practice; (c) the
patient experience; and (d) litigation.
3.1 | Montgomery's impact on legal and
professional duties
3.1.1 | Revolution or evolution?
A dominant claim in the literature on Montgomery is that it
transformed the law of informed consent.3-26 For example, one
paper suggests that ‘the Montgomery decision redefined the
standard for informed consent and disclosure’.7 Others make an
even stronger claim, stating that ‘the court enshrined the doc-
trine of informed consent formally into English law for the first
time’.25-30
This account is challenged, however, by those who argue that the
new Montgomery test ‘is merely another step along the same
PRISMA 2009 Flow Diagram
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LE GALLEZ ET AL. 5
trajectory through which [the law] has been travelling for some time’
and that the case reflects an evolution rather than a revolution.31 On
this account, which also has significant support in the literature,7,31-37
the case should be viewed as a ‘tidying up of the law rather than a
dramatic legal development’.33
3.1.2 | Symbolic or significant?
Even if Montgomery significantly changed the law, some argue that its
impact on doctors' duties is at most symbolic because the General Medi-
cal Council (GMC) has long imposed a similar patient-oriented profes-
sional duty of risk disclosure.4,7,8,17,19,20,25-27,29,31-34,36,38-54,88,89,99,101
The GMC's patient-centred duty was in fact highlighted by the Supreme
Court in Montgomery, which cited passages from the GMC's 2008 and
2013 guidelines and noted that the 1998 guidelines that were in place at
the time of Nadine Montgomery's pregnancy were ‘broadly similar in
effect’ (although the lower courts may not have been aware of this).1
The existence of GMC guidance is one reason that Lamb argues that the
case has mostly ‘symbolic’ value,36 but this account is challenged on
three grounds in the literature.
The first challenge is based on the significant differences in the
status and enforcement of legal and professional duties. For example,
Adshead et al argue that ‘in raising the status of shared decision mak-
ing from guidance to legal requirement, Montgomery changes every-
thing’, as ‘shared decision making is no longer optional but essential
to valid consent’.98 Healthcare providers can be held financially liable
for a breach of Montgomery, which is not the case with the equivalent
GMC duty. The GMC advises doctors to follow its guidelines, but
deviations are not necessarily reprimanded. The GMC might take no
action, give a warning, request undertakings or, for serious failings
that impair a doctor's fitness to practice, refer a doctor to the Medical
Practice Tribunal Service (MPTS). The MPTS has powers to restrict,
suspend, or revoke a doctor's registration.104 Given these differences
in enforceability, many papers call for the GMC guidance to be
updated post-Montgomery. As Devaney et al state, ‘it is now critical
that updated guidance is provided by the UK General Medical Council
to give practitioners and service providers confidence that they are
adhering to the law’.93
The second challenge to the claim that Montgomery is merely
symbolic comes from authors who argue that the duties imposed by
the GMC and the law are not actually the same.3,55,98 For example,
Arvind and McMahon argue that the law will have impacts that ‘differ
significantly from the GMC's goals’, as they view Montgomery as pre-
senting a consumerist and individualist version of the patient that is at
odds with the partnership model that underpins the GMC guidance.3
They highlight that we need to be aware of the ‘challenge of trans-
posing open-textured norms from one institutional context to a very
different institutional context—law and medicine’.3
This third challenge is grounded in the claim that the content of
legal and professional duties should not be the same, so that it is
problematic if they now are. For example, Heywood and Miola
argue:
[M]edical law and the GMC guidance enjoyed what we
considered to be a fruitful and well-structured relation-
ship. This was because there existed a clear difference
between the two standards. The law imposed a mini-
mum standard that patients would be entitled to: any
failure to achieve this standard would result in legal
sanctions…Meanwhile, the medical profession aspired
to more.31
On this account, Montgomery is not merely symbolic because it
alters the relationship between professional and legal duties.
3.1.3 | Catching up or driving change?
The debate about whether Montgomery is merely symbolic raises
questions about how the law and GMC guidance have shaped each
other. On one account, the evolution of the law has been driven by
the evolution of the medical practice. According to Purshouse and
Cave, for example, ‘in Montgomery, the law finally caught up with pro-
fessional guidance’.39 But this narrative is questioned by others. For
example, O'Brien argues that the GMC guidance was actually shaped
by legal cases questioning Bolam from the mid-1990s. He argues that
when the 2008 GMC guidance ‘explicitly called for a patient-centred
approach’, it was ‘reflecting the process of departure from Bolam
started by Chester v Afshar and Pearce’.55 In his view, it is clinical prac-
tice that has been slow to catch up with legal paradigm shifts on risk
disclosure and patient consent. Montgomery is therefore significant
because ‘[t]he outright rejection of Bolam in Montgomery mandates
that clinical practice does not continue to lag behind’.55
3.1.4 | Future extensions
The potential legal reach of Montgomery, beyond the factual contours
of the case, receives significant attention in the literature. For exam-
ple, Montgomery's application in cases involving children is explored in
both legal and medical papers,39,56 and its application to health
research and innovative treatment is explored in a small number of
papers.25,57 Citing two judicial decisions post-Montgomery,105,106 one
paper comments that the courts are applying Montgomery to the dis-
closure of information about ‘post-treatment risks’ and ‘follow-up
managements’.22
The potential application of Montgomery beyond treatment --
for example, to diagnosis -- continues to emerge in the literature.
Most of these articles16,30,31,58-60 focus on a Singaporean case, Hii
Chii Kok,107 where the court drew on Montgomery in ruling that
material information includes information about the diagnosis.
However, a few authors focus on UK law, such as Heywood and
Miola who argue:
If the law relating to information disclosure is about all-
owing patients to make their own decisions based on
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all of the relevant information—as Montgomery
provides—then surely a potential alternative diagnosis,
the existence of which may affect the patient's deci-
sion, would be information relevant to the patient's
ability to make the choice that she wants to make.31
The possibility of extending Montgomery even further is explored
in several papers, which suggest that Montgomery's rejection of the
deferential stance of Bolam may lead to a more general rejection of
Bolam.12,31,32,38,42,60,61,95-97 For example, Badenoch comments that ‘it
is necessary to ask whether Bolam can survive much longer before it
is banished from the issue of clinical negligence altogether’.38
3.2 | Montgomery's impact on doctors
The literature explores several ways in which Montgomery could
impact medical practice.
3.2.1 | Encouraging defensive medicine
One widely discussed possibility is that Montgomery could encourage
defensive medical practices. This concern was noted and rejected by the
Supreme Court in its decision,1 but Case argues that the Court ‘gave
short shrift to arguments based on the risk of defensive practice’,100 and
many others share her concern.7,20,36,53,60-63 For example, as Murphy
comments, Montgomery could cause doctors to become ‘less concerned
with genuine understanding and consent from the patient and more con-
cerned with mitigating the opportunities for litigation’.60 It is unclear
whether this is actually happening, however, as our systematic literature
review revealed no empirical studies on this issue.
3.2.2 | Additional pressures on doctors
Another possibility, discussed in many papers, is that the disclosure
requirements in Montgomery will create taxing burdens for doc-
tors.7,21,29,43,53,54,59,63-68,94,98,102 For example, Choudry et al comment
that it creates ‘extra demands on clinical appointments that will be diffi-
cult to meet at a time of constrained resources’,59 and there is some
empirical evidence that doctors share this concern.10,44,66 For example, a
study by Harrison et al found that some doctors were ‘reporting longer
counselling times with patients’,66 and a study by Knight et al found that
half of the respondents ‘considered the allocation of further resources,
particularly time, for the consent process…a current barrier’.10 Laing
argues that such burdens could worsen the low levels of professional
morale and high levels of stress in the NHS workforce.44
In response to this concern, many papers question the
premise that Montgomery actually creates new burdens,
highlighting that the GMC has long imposed similar disclosure
requirements.4,7,8,17,19,20,25-27,29,31-34,36,38-54,88-90,99,101 For example,
Lamb argues that ‘it is unlikely that a slightly greater focus on the par-
ticular patient…will lead to any real practical impact on the day-to-day
action of doctors’.36 In fact, the Supreme Court made a similar point
in Montgomery, noting the concern about time pressure but rejecting
it on the grounds that the GMC had ‘long required a broadly similar
approach’.1 The Court also noted that a similar legal requirement ‘has
long been operated in other jurisdictions, where healthcare practice
presumably adjusted to its requirements’.1
However, the literature discussed above (in “Symbolic or signifi-
cant?”) identifies several reasons why the Supreme Court ruling may
increase doctors' burdens despite similar duties in pre-existing GMC
guidance. First, a breach of the duty can now result in financial liabil-
ity. Second, the patient-oriented standard is now binding; there is no
longer any ambiguity about whether this approach is merely advisable
and aspirational. Third, the Court's approach may shift the doctor-
patient relationship away from the partnership model and towards a
consumeristic model of healthcare.
Some commentators accept, at least for the sake of argument,
thatMontgomery increases doctors' burdens, and argue that this is jus-
tifiable. For example, as Badenoch comments:
[L]ack of time for adequate dialogue with the patient
may seem an ever present and even insuperable prob-
lem. It must be overcome, because what is at issue is
the patient's most basic and fundamental right to
decide, on adequate information, whether to submit or
not to proposed treatment, or which of alternatives to
choose or accept.38
Others highlight that spending more time in discussion with the
patient pre-treatment could save time and other resources down the line.
For example, if the disclosure causes the patient to decline the treatment,
this will save time spent in unwanted medical care41; or if they do accept
the treatment, the disclosure might reduce ‘the likelihood of doctors
becoming the subject of a lawsuit’.93 Birch and Todd calculated that the
cost of spending 30 minutes extra with each patient (to ensureMontgom-
ery compliance) for operations such as arthroplasty would be offset by
reduced legal claims, leading to annual savings of £10million.54
A final set of arguments in support of Montgomery identify ways
in which it might improve medical practice.41,43,44,52,53,98,100,103 For
example, Herring et al conclude that the Montgomery standard ‘gives
power to the clinical elbow in delivering best practice in contemporary
person-centred care’.41 It also provides a legal justification for devot-
ing the resources needed for good consent practices, as Adshead et al
argue in their work on psychiatry: ‘So long as shared decision making
was optional there was no real incentive to provide the resources to
support this’.98 If the legal responsibilities are clearer, doctors may be
better educated and supported in providing information to their
patients.
3.2.3 | Doctors' awareness of and compliance with
Montgomery
A common claim in the literature—particularly in the medical
literature--is that Montgomery's impact on medical practice
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might be limited by doctors' limited awareness of the
ruling.10,11,49,53,55,56,66,67,69,102,103
In empirical studies, the percentage of doctors who report famil-
iarity with the ruling ranges from 8.3%10 to 45%.55 One study found
that this varies across specialties (with 8.3% of orthopaedic surgeons
reporting unfamiliarity with the ruling, compared to 18.8% of urolo-
gists and 20.2% of general surgeons), as well as clinician grade (with
80% of consultants reporting unfamiliarity, compared to 52% at the
registrar or below).10
For these reasons, many conclude that we need to improve doc-
tors' understanding of UK consent law.44,52,55,67,88 Wheeler et al
argue that ‘this disparity between what is and what should be known
dates from a long-term failure of medical education to teach clinical
law’.88 Laing emphasizes that ‘if Montgomery is to become a meaning-
ful reality, medical students and clinicians at all levels and in all areas
of practice must be supported and provided with the appropriate
tools to enable them to strive to achieve this individualised patient-
centred approach’.44 This systematic review found no papers about
whether or how Montgomery has been incorporated into medical stu-
dent training.
However, it might be a mistake to assume that increased knowl-
edge of Montgomery will always result in a change in medical prac-
tice.10,66,69 For instance, one study found that only half of the doctors
who said they were aware of Montgomery (36.6% of the total sample)
reported changing their practice as a result.69 It is possible that the
other doctors concluded that they were already compliant with
Montgomery's requirements, but the paper does not address this issue.
3.3 | Montgomery's impact on patients
3.3.1 | Patient-centred care and autonomy
It is widely agreed that Montgomery will foster more patient-oriented
care, but there is a difference of opinion about what this means for
patient autonomy.
Many articles focus on the Court's elevation of patient autonomy and
its disapproval of medical paternalism.3,5-10,12-17,19,22,25-28,30-68,70-86,90
The case is described as ‘the final step in a legal power shift from paternal-
ism to patient autonomy’40 and ‘a landmark case…which shifted focus
from a traditional paternalistic model of consent towards a more patient-
centred approach’.33 However, others argue that this narrative is overly
simplistic, with one paper noting that pitting autonomy and paternalism
against one another does not adequately reflect how ‘medical decision
making involves a nuanced negotiation of information’.7
Other papers interrogate the ambiguity surrounding the concept of
autonomy, including how the Supreme Court used the concept in Mont-
gomery.5,6,9,23,42 For example, Heywood highlights the Court's use of
"autonomy" in Montgomery c"ompared to its use of "self-determination"
in Sidaway:
The variance in language may only be subtle, and it could
be argued on one level that self-determination and
autonomy mean the same thing, but the term autonomy
somehow seems to evoke more powerful connotations of
a rights-based approach from judges.42
Cave has a similar view and argues that the case showed a ‘com-
mitment to a more substantive concept of autonomy by the Supreme
Court’.6 However, other authors interpret the Court's view differ-
ently. For example, Arvind and McMahon argue that the Court
adopted a consumerist version of autonomy, which they argue is
problematic for the parties and more broadly for the ‘development of
medical law’.3
3.3.2 | Patients' views
We found only one empirical study of patients' views related to Mont-
gomery.21 Howard et al assess patients' views of material risk in the
trauma setting, reporting that patients were unable to identify mate-
rial risks following consent and that ‘this highlights the difficulties of
applying the Montgomery ruling in a trauma surgery setting’.21
3.4 | Montgomery's impact on litigation
3.4.1 | Speculation on litigation trends
The possibility that Montgomery will lead to an increase in litigation is
widely discussed in the literature. This possibility was in fact raised by
the Supreme Court in Montgomery, which ultimately concluded that
litigation might actually decrease:
An approach which results in patients being aware that
the outcome of treatment is uncertain and potentially
dangerous, and in their taking responsibility for the
ultimate choice to undergo that treatment, may be less
likely to encourage recriminations.1
These comments by the Court were necessarily speculative, but
the subsequent literature has also not reached any firm conclusions
on this issue.5,7,36,38,42,54,59,60,67,76,77,94,98 Some note that in the wake
of Montgomery, lawyers amended claims that they had already submit-
ted, adding an allegation of failure to obtain the patient's informed
consent under the new rule.7,27,31,32,35,99 Others suggest that a
broader shift is unlikely given that doctors had a similar duty under
GMC guidelines.34,50,90 Discussing case law after Montgomery, Laing
suggests that the floodgates fear ‘has not necessarily’ materialized.44
Surprisingly, six years after the judgement, there are no empirical
analyses of overall litigation levels for information disclosure claims,
although there is one specifically relating to children.39 It reports,
based on a freedom of information (FOI) application to NHS Resolu-
tion in March 2018, that ‘paediatric claims related to non-disclosure
of information have increased, whilst the number of successful claims
has fallen’.39 However, we note that the number of claims was too
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small for statistical significance, and litigation rates for other types of
medical negligence have also increased (which casts doubt on the idea
that Montgomery is the sole or primary cause of the observed
increase).
3.4.2 | Litigation outcomes less predictable
Even if litigation for negligent disclosure has not increased, many sug-
gest that outcomes have become less predictable post-Montgom-
ery.5,32,36,42,47,60,64,77,100 This unpredictability is commonly attributed to
uncertainty concerning how courts will assess material
risks,9,11,19,21,23,32,33,45,46,60,75,77,86,88,89,91,103 apply the subjective
patient limb of the test,9,18,22,23,31,36,41,42,48,60,81,86,90,92 allow the thera-
peutic exception,5,6,22,25,31,33,34,37,58-60,78,82,92 and identify reasonable
alternative treatments.9,18,25,28,31,42,59,60,90,92-94 We found no data con-
firming or denying these assertions.
4 | DISCUSSION
This systematic review is the first to summarize and compare the legal
and medical literature on Montgomery. Having demonstrated that its
impact on medicine and the law is more complex and contested than
it would seem, we now turn to three broader observations about the
literature. First, the literature identifies a dynamic relationship
between professional norms and the law. Second, many of the poten-
tial impacts of Montgomery are hard to verify due to a lack of empirical
research. Third, the potential for Montgomery to apply beyond treat-
ment requires further exploration.
4.1 | Relationship between GMC guidance and law
The review revealed a variety of views on the relationship between
GMC ethical guidance and Montgomery. As discussed above, there is
disagreement about whether Montgomery merely caught up with
GMC guidance, whether the law should be as demanding as profes-
sional GMC guidance, and whether the GMC guidance itself had been
shaped by the law. It is also worth noting that these arguments con-
tinue a debate about the interplay between GMC guidance and medi-
cal law that pre-dates Montgomery. For example, in 2010, Miola and
Fovargue argued that the GMC's 2008 consent guidance embodied a
‘step back’ as ‘doctors [were] required to tell their patients less than
they were in 1998’, bringing the ethical standard ‘down and closer to
the legal standard’.108
The particular cat-and-mouse dynamics of Montgomery and GMC
guidance about information disclosure are interesting but in general, it
is clear that law and professional guidance influence, but do not deter-
mine, each other. This has long been apparent, and a recent article by
Samanta, Samanta, and Beswick109 discusses the interplay between
law and clinical guidelines (including those issued by the GMC and the
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) in detail. They note
that although these guidelines are not dispositive in legal disputes,
they ‘can be persuasive or influential upon judicial decision making’
and can affect ‘decisions about whether to abandon or settle a claim
at an early stage’, as there is a presumption ‘that clinicians should fol-
low nationally endorsed and authoritative guidelines unless there are
cogent reasons for not doing so’.109 This can be problematic, how-
ever, if the guidelines were meant to be aspirational rather than
binding.
At the same time, legal rules can influence clinical guidelines,
given widespread acceptance that it is unethical and unprofessional
for doctors to act unlawfully. In fact, Montgomery might have
influenced GMC guidance, on this occasion causing it to raise the dis-
closure bar further. In its new consent guidance, released at the end
of 2020,110 the GMC advises that doctors should not only disclose
alternative treatments, but also diagnostic uncertainty—an issue that
we discuss below.
4.2 | A lack of empirical studies post-Montgomery
Although we identified a handful of empirical papers analysing doc-
tors' and patients' reflections on Montgomery or the issues it raises,
the extent of empirical research is very low considering the amount of
empirical speculation in the literature. Further empirical research is
needed to properly understand the impact of Montgomery.
For example, we found no empirical studies of whether the legal
change in Montgomery has created new pressures on doctors,
increased defensive medicine, or been incorporated into medical train-
ing or practice. Likewise, we found no studies of Montgomery's impact
on litigation. NHS Resolution's responses to our FOI requests showed
that payments where the primary claim was ‘Fail To Warn-Informed
Consent’ increased by 177% between the years 2014/15 and
2019/20.111 This data suggests that Montgomery may have led to
increased litigation and/or damages, but further work is needed to
determine this because the total number of medical negligence claims
also increased and payments can be influenced by a small number of
high value cases.
There is also very little empirical research about the impact of
Montgomery for patients, although the case is widely considered ‘a
victory for patients’.44 Further searches revealed a paper by Convie
et al, which provides a qualitative synthesis of 16 studies that have
explored patients' and physicians' views of informed consent.112
While only six of these studies were from the United Kingdom, their
conclusions could be relevant here. For example, they conclude that
the desire of many patients ‘to be seen as a “model patient” impairs
their ability to actively participate in the informed consent process’,
as the patients feel ‘a responsibility not to waste doctor's time with,
what they thought was, their own trivial queries in relation to con-
sent’.112 Convie et al find that this is especially the case when
‘patients [use] publicly funded and resource strapped healthcare’.112
We found no other studies of UK patients' awareness of their rights
under Montgomery or its impact on their medical decision making.
Thus, the literature on this issue remains sparse despite Rob Heywood
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et al highlighting the need for work on it in a 2008 study.113 This gap
in understanding is striking given the patient-centric emphasis of both
Montgomery and the GMC guidance. Patients' experiences and views
of their healthcare are also increasingly recognized as being critical to
healthcare improvement research.114,115
Future empirical research could explore whether patients are
familiar with their rights under Montgomery; which risks they consider
material in particular settings; whether they value the communication
that Montgomery requires; how they determine the risks they consider
material; whether they perceive consent practices to be more defen-
sive; and whether they desire information that is not currently assured
(e.g., information about uncertainty in their diagnosis).
4.3 | Montgomery's relevance beyond treatment
While the language of Montgomery focuses on treatment (requiring
the disclosure of ‘material risks involved in any recommended treat-
ment’ and ‘any reasonable alternative or variant treatments’),1 its
rationale clearly extends further. For example, it seems uncon-
troversial to suggest that a doctor must disclose the material risks—as
defined by Montgomery's two-prong test—when seeking consent to a
non-treatment medical procedure, such as a biopsy (although this has
not, to our knowledge, been tested in court).
What is less clear is whether doctors should also disclose risks
unrelated to medical procedures on the human body, such as those
created by diagnostic uncertainty. This question has received little
attention in the literature. This gap is problematic for three reasons.
First, it leaves doctors uncertain about the scope of their duties of
disclosure—and thus their potential liability. For example, it is unclear
how much they should inform patients about their diagnoses, the
diagnostic process, and the uncertainties inherent in this process. Sec-
ond and relatedly, it leaves patients uncertain about the full extent of
their rights. Third, the law is developing rules without sufficient atten-
tion to their boundaries and potential implications.
For these reasons, an interdisciplinary analysis of the potential
application of Montgomery to all aspects of the medical encounter,
including diagnosis, would be beneficial.
4.4 | Strengths and limitations
This is a comprehensive review of the literature on Montgomery
reported in core medical and legal databases, analysed by an interdis-
ciplinary team. Given the nature of this type of piece, we did not
engage in direct analysis of the case law applying Montgomery, so our
analysis will not capture cases that have not yet been discussed along-
side Montgomery in the literature. In order to ensure a rigorous and
replicable methodology, we did not include ‘soft’ literature such as
blog posts; as a result, our review will only capture insights from the
soft literature if they were subsequently published in academic
papers. In order to refine the scope of the article, we excluded work
that examinedMontgomery outside of the medical context or that spe-
cifically addressed an area outside of medical negligence; by doing
this, we may have missed some relevant analyses of situations analo-
gous to those that occur in medicine. Papers written in other lan-
guages were not included. Finally, we note that the extraction of data
for this review has more subjectivity than typical systematic reviews
due to the nature of the literature being reviewed.
5 | CONCLUSIONS
This review identifies and reveals the limits of many common claims
about the legal and medical significance of Montgomery. It is clear that
the case significantly changed the law of informed consent—replacing
a doctor-based standard for the disclosure of risk with a patient-based
standard—but this change might be best seen as an evolution rather
than a revolution.31 Although some go further and argue that, in prac-
tice, Montgomery is primarily symbolic given that the GMC has long
imposed a similar duty, this account fails to recognize important ways
in which legal and professional duties differ. For example, the fact that
the duty is now legally binding could increase time pressures on doc-
tors or encourage defensive medicine. However, such criticisms are
speculative, as there has been little empirical research in this area.
Rather than making doctors work harder, Montgomery might actually
be helping them, supplying a legal justification for the type of patient-
centred care that they want to provide.
With respect to patients, most authors agree that Montgomery
will foster more patient-oriented care, but there is a difference of
opinion about what this means for patient autonomy—in part because
there is disagreement about how autonomy is and should be concep-
tualized in the law. Very little is known about patients' views of the
judgement, or whether Montgomery-compliant discussions are feasible
in all settings. There is also a dearth of data about Montgomery's
impact on litigation and speculations differ dramatically. There are
reasons to believe that it will generate both more and less litigation,
and that outcomes will be more unpredictable either way.
To resolve many of the questions generated by Montgomery,
empirical research is required. For example, we must seek to under-
stand patients' and clinicians' views on how the obligation to
respect patients can best be met despite competing professional
obligations and resource constraints. This research must be care-
fully configured to ensure that balanced data is collected from
patients and clinicians, investigating the feasibility and opportunity
costs of Montgomery alongside its direct and indirect benefits.
There is also a need for further analysis of the case law following
Montgomery to understand how the decision is being interpreted
and applied by courts. For example, one question that requires
attention is whether Montgomery governs disclosures of risks asso-
ciated with diagnostic uncertainty, where doctors advise patients
without performing procedures on their bodies. Thus, six years
after Montgomery, there is still much empirical and legal research
needed to understand its full significance.
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